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Environment and Energy
Catastrophic Liabilities from 
Nuclear Power Plants
Geoﬀrey Heal and Howard Kunreuther
9.1    Introduction
Through a comprehensive system of preparedness, protection, response, 
and recovery administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), the Federal Government has responsibility for reducing risks and 
aiding the recovery of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-
  made disasters. The manner in which public sector organizations manage 
the natural environment can aﬀect the risks that government will ultimately 
face. Some possible liabilities of the Federal Government are associated 
with environmental risks, many of which are linked to climate change. For 
example, the potential for global warming depends on what we do with our 
energy systems. Moreover, the way the Federal Government manages many 
environmental processes can aﬀect our vulnerability to a range of natural 
disasters, not just those associated with climate change.
One source of energy that is now being seriously considered for addressing 
the climate change issue is nuclear power. Since the accident at the Three 
Mile Island nuclear power plant in Middletown, Pennsylvania in March 
1979, there has not been a single nuclear power plant constructed in the 
United States. However, James Rogers, CEO of Duke Energy, said in 2007 
that nuclear power “is still the best way to produce electricity with zero 
greenhouse gases from the actual operation”—even compared with energy 
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sources such as wind. The Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO) estimated 
in May 2008 that a carbon price of between $20 and $45 per ton—which 
many projections say is feasible—would make nuclear competitive with coal 
(Johnson 2008). We therefore include the risks associated with nuclear power 
in our analysis.
We begin with an overview of the economic value of environmental sys-
tems in mitigating natural disasters and then consider the role of the Fed-
eral Government in managing these hazards and the potential liabilities 
that they may incur should there be a catastrophic disaster. In the second 
part of the chapter we focus on nuclear power as a source of energy and 
ask whether the risks associated with this technology could be managed 
more eﬃciently by private insurance markets rather than through the current 
arrangements under the Price- Anderson (P- A) Act. As we demonstrate, the 
P-  A Act imposes signiﬁ  cant liabilities on the Federal Government should 
there be large-  scale losses from a future accident at a nuclear power plant. 
To gain insights into an increased role for the private sector in managing this 
technology, programs by which other catastrophic risks are managed today 
are reviewed in the concluding portion of the chapter.
9.2      Natural Capital as an Asset
A nation’s environmental assets are diverse and important. Environmen-
tal economists talk about natural capital on a par with physical, human, 
intellectual, and other forms of capital.1 Environmental assets, like any other 
assets, provide a ﬂ  ow of services over time. Often they provide these services 
over very long periods of time, periods that are orders of magnitude greater 
than those relevant for most other forms of capital. If we value these assets 
at the present value of their services, then by applying conventional discount 
rates we lose most of the contributions that they make.
A good example is the New York City watershed, a collection of naturally-
  occurring ecosystems in the Catskills that cleanse and stabilize the ﬂ  ow of 
water to New York, and if not disturbed can continue to do so for centuries. 
Recently, the city spent over $1 billion restoring the ecological integrity of 
this watershed, in order to restore the city’s water to earlier levels of purity. 
We can see this as an investment in natural capital, with the beneﬁ  t being the 
ﬂ  ow of clean water and the avoidance of a complex and expensive ﬁ  ltration 
plant costing over $8 billion.2 Although the Catskills watershed is an asset 
to New York City, which has invested extensively in it, the city does not own 
it. The watershed consists of land in the Catskills, most of which is privately 
owned either as farms or as homes. Today the city provides ﬁ  nancial incen-
1. For a discussion see Barbier and Heal (2006) and the references there.
2. For more details see Heal (2000) and National Research Council (2004). For a detailed 
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tives for people living and working in the watershed area to behave in ways 
that are consistent with the continued operation of the watershed, such as 
paying for farm fences to be set back from stream boundaries to keep ani-
mals well away from streams.
Natural resources such as oil, gas, coal, and various other mineral deposits 
are also a form of natural capital, and the values of these are often reﬂ  ected 
in the valuations of their owners, usually corporations. It is generally rec-
ognized that one of the main determinants of the stock market value of 
an oil company is the value of its oil reserves.3 An interesting point is that 
if a corporation depletes its oil reserves, then under US GAAP4 and most 
equivalents, it must record this as depletion of assets in its ﬁ  nancial state-
ments. If, however, a nation depletes its reserves of oil or any other mineral 
resource, then the United Nations System of National Accounts does not 
require that it record a depletion charge against its income. If the national 
accounts of oil-  producing countries were to record depletion charges, then 
their incomes would drop very signiﬁ  cantly indeed.5
The climate system as well can also be viewed as an asset to the extent 
that it may induce individuals to reside in speciﬁ  c areas. Florida’s climate 
goes a long way to explaining why people choose to live there, and some of 
the economic value that it generates is reﬂ  ected in land values. Climate also 
plays an important role in determining agricultural productivity. The climate 
system is more than the temperature, though that is a central part of it: the 
humidity, precipitation, and wind patterns all impact on the economic value 
of speciﬁ  c areas.
Today, we are seeing that changes in the world’s climate system, combined 
with increasing assets at risk, is threatening this value. For example, the 
population of Florida has increased signiﬁ  cantly over the past ﬁ  fty years: 2.8 
million inhabitants in 1950, 6.8 million in 1970, 13 million in 1990, and a pro-
jected 19.3 million population in 2010 (almost a 600 percent increase since 
1950) (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2007). The increase in the exposed 
property values in risk-  prone areas due to a combination of pure inﬂ  ation, 
speculation, and rises in the standard of living increase the chance of signiﬁ  -
cant insured losses from future natural disasters. If Hurricane Andrew had 
occurred in 2002 rather than 1992, it would have inﬂ  icted twice the economic 
losses, due principally to increasing development and rising asset values in 
Miami-Dade County and adjoining coastal areas in Florida aﬀected by the 
storm (Dlugolecki 2006).
Compounding this increase in exposure is a trend for tropical 
storms/  hurricanes and typhoons to become more intense over time due to 
3. See, for example, Miller and Upton (1985).
4. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
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global warming. Emanuel (2005) introduces an index of potential destruc-
tiveness of hurricanes based on the total dissipation power over the lifetime 
of the storm. The index shows a large increase in power dissipation over 
the past thirty years and concludes that this increase may be due to the fact 
that storms have become more intense, on average, and/  or have survived 
longer at high intensity. His study also shows that the annual average storm 
peak wind speed over the North Atlantic and eastern and western North 
Paciﬁ  c has increased by 50 percent over the past thirty years. Recent work 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007) indicates 
that one of the impacts of a change in climate will be an increase in weather 
extremes. We are likely to witness not only more intense storms, but also 
more intense heat waves and drought, and more intense ﬂ  ooding episodes 
as well. The impacts are predicted to be more important in many low-   and 
middle-  income countries (Africa, South America, Asia) than in the devel-
oped world.
9.3    Environmental  Liabilities
What does this tell us about environmental liabilities? Certain categories 
are widely recognized, such as those generated by the Superfund legislation 
and liabilities associated with past pollution activities. In the case of Super-
fund there are open questions as to who is liable because of the complexi-
ties of joint liabilities. But in general, these are the responsibilities of the 
private sector not the Federal Government, with the exception of Depart-
ment of Defense sites, whose clean-  up costs have been estimated at over 
$30 billion.6
A more prominent source of liabilities of the Federal Government arises 
from changes in natural capital that lead to its ceasing to provide important 
services, often protective services. Much natural capital has the character-
istics of public goods, so that the government is normally responsible for 
its maintenance. A timely example is the gradual destruction of the bar-
rier islands in the Gulf of Mexico oﬀshore from New Orleans. Histori-
cally, these islands protected New Orleans from storm surges, mitigating 
the impacts of the strongest storms. Their gradual disappearance contrib-
uted to the severity of the destruction wrought by Hurricane Katrina,7 
creating liabilities for the Federal Government through the designation 
of the region as a Presidentially-  declared disaster area. Some estimates 
suggest that the total cost of Hurricane Katrina is in excess of $150 bil-
lion, with a signiﬁ  cant part being the liability of the Federal Govern-
ment (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2009). This is an environmental 
liability because it arose in part as a predictable consequence of the degra-
6. See the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce (2005) report for more details.
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dation of natural capital. The 2007 Staﬀord Act makes the Federal Govern-
ment legally liable for damages of this sort, and politically it surely is: the 
public expects the Federal Government to step in and oﬀer restitution in 
situations such as Katrina.
Hurricane Katrina is illustrative of a class of situations where the Fed-
eral Government may incur liabilities as a result of its failure to adequately 
manage environmental issues. In this case, a part of the cause of the disaster 
was undoubtedly the changes in the topography of the area around New 
Orleans as a result of dredging and canalization, and the removal of bar-
rier islands, all of which can be considered degradation of natural capital 
or of environmental assets. The US Army Corps of Engineers, a Federal 
Agency, carried out many of these changes. In addition, some argue that 
climate change made a contribution to the severity of Katrina, and that the 
Federal Government, by failing to act on this issue contributed further to 
the severity of the problem (Emanuel 2008). The general point here is that 
to the extent that degradation of natural capital leads to increased severity 
and frequency of natural disasters, there is an increase in Federal liability, 
although this is hard to quantify. The natural disasters associated with the 
mismanagement of natural capital could include storms, wildﬁ  res, ﬂ  oods, 
and droughts, all of which can generate liabilities in the billions.
The bottom line is that natural capital is a hugely important asset, and its 
maintenance, normally being a Federal responsibility, can have huge impacts 
on Federal liabilities. These liabilities are hard to measure, but as the de facto 
insurer of last resort for catastrophes, it will often pick up the check.
9.4    Nuclear  Liabilities
The current resurgence of interest in nuclear power owes a lot to concerns 
about the environmental impacts of fossil fuels. Nuclear power is largely 
carbon neutral and has no signiﬁ  cant climate impact, but it does have other 
risks. A move to nuclear power is replacing one kind of environmental risk 
by another. The Federal Government accepted liability for the lion’s share 
of the risks from a nuclear power plant catastrophe through the passage of 
the Price- Anderson (P- A) Act in 1957. Nuclear power stations have a rather 
unique environmental proﬁ  le, in that when operating as planned they pro-
duce little if any environmental damage, emitting neither gases nor pollut-
ants of any kind. There is, however, a small chance of a very serious accident, 
such as a core meltdown leading to damaging pollution, as in 1986 at the 
Chernobyl nuclear reactor in the Ukraine. In this case, clouds of radioac-
tive waste ﬂ  oated over much of the Ukraine, Belarus, Eastern and Western 
Europe, and Scandinavia with fatalities estimated by international agencies 
to be about 9,000 individuals. Core meltdowns have also occurred twice in 
the United States, once at the Enrico Fermi reactor in Newport, Michigan, 
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It is generally believed that little or no radiation was released in either of 
these cases (Lochbaum 2006).
In addition to the risk of a core meltdown, nuclear power stations pose 
problems associated with the disposal of their radioactive wastes. Over its 
operating life, a nuclear power station will produce many tons of highly 
radioactive long- lived waste, which pose a health hazard for many centuries. 
Since September 11, 2001, the wastes have been recognized as a possible 
ingredient for a dirty bomb used in a terrorist attack. The method for dispos-
ing of radioactive wastes from nuclear power stations is highly controversial, 
with no country having yet implemented a coherent long- term policy. In the 
United States, the proposed policy is that waste will be buried at the Yucca 
Mountain Repository in Nevada, but this has not been implemented. In the 
meantime, many hundreds of tons of highly radioactive waste sit in contain-
ment tanks at the sites of commercial nuclear power stations, often poorly 
guarded. Were some of this to fall into the wrong hands, the costs could be 
immense and would be the responsibility of the Federal Government: there 
is a Federal liability here.
A core meltdown is generally agreed to be the most serious accident that 
can occur to a nuclear power station. What is the risk of this event, and what 
are the possible consequences? In the United States, 104 commercial reactors 
have been built and operated. As noted, two reactors—Enrico Fermi and 
Three Mile Island—have experienced core meltdowns. In addition, accord-
ing to data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), four have 
been closed in excess of one year for serious failures that if not corrected 
could have caused core meltdowns.8 This means that six in 104 reactors have 
experienced meltdowns or near-  meltdowns. Normally these data are not 
presented as X meltdowns or near-  meltdowns in Y reactors, but rather as 
X meltdowns or near-  meltdowns per Z reactor years, a numerically much 
smaller risk.
All the meltdowns and most of the near- meltdowns occurred in the 1960s 
and 1970s, which suggests that the risks are highest early in the life cycle of 
a reactor design. This would be reasonable, and consistent with the idea of 
a learning curve associated with the management of something as complex 
as a nuclear power station. This may be reassuring as far as the safety of 
existing reactors is concerned, but disturbing when one recognizes that the 
currently-  proposed expansion of nuclear power would be through new and 
as- yet untried reactor designs that are focused on reducing the (very substan-
tial) capital costs of nuclear power stations. The Federal Government has 
received or expects to receive applications to build thirty-  four new nuclear 
reactors at twenty-  three sites (Wald 2008). A new generation of reactors 
could take us back to the top of the learning curve and into an era of risk 
not experienced since the 1960s and 1970s.
8. Data from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission is available in Lochbaum 2006.Environment and Energy: Catastrophic Liabilities    2 4 1
What would be the costs of a core meltdown in which, as in the Cher-
nobyl case, radiation was released from the containment vessel? There is no 
general theory for such an estimate, so we focus on a speciﬁ  c case, the case 
of Indian Point, a nuclear power station owned by Entergy Corporation 
and situated on the Hudson River twenty-  four miles north of New York 
City. The huge population densities in the region make an accident here par-
ticularly threatening. Nuclear fallout from the plant could reach populated 
areas including New York City, northern New Jersey, and Fairﬁ  eld County, 
Connecticut. A 1982 study by Sandia National Laboratories found that a 
core meltdown and radiological release at one of the two operating Indian 
Point reactors could cause 50,000 near-  term deaths from acute radiation 
syndrome and 14,000 long-  term deaths from cancer.9 In addition to these 
horrifying health impacts, the release of a cloud of radioactivity over New 
York City could close the city down for business for a considerable period 
of time.
The ﬁ  nancial costs of such an event are clearly stunning: 64,000 deaths 
valued at $6 million per person alone would imply a cost of $384 billion. 
By contrast, insured business losses and business interruptions from the 
September 11 terrorist attacks were valued at $32.5 billion (Kunreuther and 
Michel-Kerjan 2004). A disaster at Indian Point could possibly have a more 
disruptive eﬀect on activity in the New York metropolitan area than the 
September 11 attacks, and for a much longer period of time. Business inter-
ruption losses in the range of $50 to 100 billion are possible, in addition to 
the costs associated with loss of life and damage to health. It is therefore 
reasonable to think that the direct and indirect costs of a nuclear accident 
could be in the hundreds of billions of dollars. Indeed, a worst-  case sce-
nario could lead to the closure of New York City for years, as happened at 
Chernobyl, which is still closed over twenty-  two years after the meltdown, 
leading to almost unthinkable costs.
9.5      The Price-  Anderson Act and Nuclear Accident Insurance10
The Price-  Anderson (P-A) Act, originally enacted by Congress in 1957, 
limits the liability of the nuclear industry in the event of a nuclear acci-
dent in the United States. The Act was passed in order to encourage the 
construction of nuclear power plants in the United States. At the same 
time, P-  A provides a ready source of funds to compensate potential 
accident victims that would otherwise not be available. The Act covers 
large power reactors, small research and test reactors, fuel reprocessing 
plants, and enrichment facilities for incidents that occur through plant 
9.  For  more  details  see  http:/ / www.ucsusa.org/ news/ press_release/ new- study- predicts
- up- to- 44000- prompt- fatalities- and- 518000- longterm- deaths- from- indian- point- terror- attack
.html.
10. For more details on nuclear accident insurance see Nuclear Energy Institute (2005).242        Geoffrey Heal and Howard Kunreuther
operation as well as transportation and storage of nuclear fuel and radio-
active wastes. The Act is seen as central to the commercial viability of 
nuclear power.
The P-  A Act sets up two tiers of insurance. Each utility is required to 
maintain the maximum amount of coverage available from the private insur-
ance industry—currently $300 million per site. This coverage is written for 
nuclear power plants in the United States by the American Nuclear Insurers, 
a joint underwriting association or “pool” of insurance companies. If claims 
following an accident exceed that primary layer of insurance, all nuclear 
operators are obligated to pay up to $100.59 million for each reactor they 
operate, payable at the rate of $10 million per reactor, per year. As of Feb-
ruary 2005, the US public currently has more than $10 billion of insurance 
protection in the event of a nuclear reactor incident. More than $200 million 
has been paid in claims and costs of litigation since the Price- Anderson Act 
went into eﬀect, all of it by the insurance pools. Of this amount, approxi-
mately $71 million has been paid in claims and costs of litigation related to 
the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island.
As part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, signed into law by President 
George W. Bush on August 8, 2005, Price-  Anderson was reauthorized for 
the next twenty years. This is the ﬁ  fth time that Congress has reauthorized 
the Act since it was ﬁ  rst passed in 1957 but it is the longest extension ever 
granted. High prices and dwindling supplies of fossil fuels have increased 
interest in nuclear energy, and the long extension of P-  A may increase the 
feasibility of investment in nuclear power plants. Although, as noted before, 
no nuclear power plants have been built in the United States since the Three 
Mile Island accident in 1979, there are now nearly three dozen applications 
for new reactors.11
9.6      Are Nuclear Power Plant Accidents an Insurable Risk?
A principal reason for the passage of the P- A Act was to protect the utili-
ties against the possibility of a catastrophic loss from a nuclear power plant 
accident. Private insurers were reluctant to provide this coverage because 
they were uncertain about the likelihood of a severe accident (e.g., a core 
meltdown) and the consequences of such a disaster. In other words, it was 
believed at the time that protection against nuclear accidents did not satisfy 
the conditions for insurability of a risk by the private sector. Is this indeed 
correct—is it really necessary that the government should assume the liabili-
ties associated with the P-  A Act, or could we, in fact, rely on the private 
sector to play this role?
The conditions for insurability in the context of environmental risks have 
11.  See  http:/ / www.cbsnews.com/ stories/ 2008/ 06/ 13/ national/ main4181049.shtml?source
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been examined by Freeman and Kunreuther (1997). Cummins (2006) and 
Litan (2006) have recently examined this issue in the context of catastrophic 
risks. The discussion that follows uses concepts from these papers to focus on 
how an insurer decides whether or not to provide coverage against damage 
from an environmental risk.
9.6.1      Law of Large Numbers
Insurers are likely to be concerned about the variability of proﬁ  ts from 
the risks they insure. The ideal risk is one where the potential loss from each 
insured is relatively small and independent of the losses from other policy-
holders. As the insurer increases the number of policies it issues in a year, 
the variance in its annual losses decreases. In other words, the law of large 
numbers makes it highly unlikely that the insurer will suﬀer an extremely 
large loss relative to the premiums collected.
Insurance against underground storage tank (UST) leaks is an example 
of an environmental risk that satisﬁ  es the law of large numbers since losses 
are normally independent of one another. To illustrate the application of 
this law, suppose that an insurer wants to determine the estimated loss for a 
group of identical USTs, each of which has a 1/  100 annual chance of leak-
ing and causing damage of $100,000. The expected annual loss for each 
UST would be $1,000 (i.e., 1/  100  $100,000). As the number of UST poli-
cies n increases, then the variance of the expected annual loss decreases in 
proportion to n. Cummins (2006) considers the case where the insurer is 
willing to accept a low probability of insolvency ε arising out of a cata-
strophic loss when insuring a book of business. He shows that for risks 
that are independent and whose losses are characterized by the normal 
distribution so that the central limit theorem applies, the equity capital 
per policy approaches zero as the number of insured policies becomes 
very large.
9.6.2    Conditions  for  Insurability
The application of the law of large numbers is predicated on the ability 
of insurers to estimate the likelihood and consequences of a risk and for the 
risks to be independent of each other. The risks associated with large-  scale 
catastrophic disasters or accidents are unlikely to satisfy the law of large 
numbers. The following three conditions can then determine the degree to 
which such a risk is insurable.
Condition 1 is the ability to identify and quantify the chances of the event 
occurring and the resulting losses under diﬀerent levels of insurance cover-
age. Condition 2 is the ability to set premiums for each potential customer 
or class of customers that reﬂ  ect the risk. Condition 3 is the ability to make 
a positive expected proﬁ  t by providing coverage against the risk. We now 
examine each condition and raise some questions related to the ability of 
private insurers to provide coverage.244        Geoffrey Heal and Howard Kunreuther
Condition 1: Identifying the Risk
To satisfy this condition, estimates must be made of the frequency at 
which speciﬁ  c events occur and the magnitude of the loss. The risk of 
a leaky UST is one with which the insurance industry is relatively com-
fortable because there is past data and scientiﬁ  c information that enables 
them to determine both the likelihood and consequences of such an 
event. Due to the infrequency of nuclear power plant accidents, it is 
much more diﬃcult to estimate these parameters for insurance against 
this risk.
Condition 2: Setting Premiums that Reﬂ  ect the Risk
Once the risk has been identiﬁ  ed, insurers need to determine a premium 
that reﬂ  ects the risk while not posing an unacceptably high chance of insol-
vency or severe loss of surplus due to a catastrophic loss. There are several 
factors that determine what premiums insurers would like to charge.
Ambiguity of Risk A risk is ambiguous if one cannot assign a probabil-
ity to it. Insurers (and indeed, decision makers in general) dislike ambigu-
ity. The greater the ambiguity of a speciﬁ  c loss the higher the premium 
will be. In a mail survey of professional actuaries conducted by the Casu-
alty Actuarial Society, 463 respondents indicated how much they would 
charge to cover losses against a defective product in two cases, one where 
the probabilities of a loss (p) was well speciﬁ  ed at p  .001, and one where 
they experienced considerable uncertainty about the likelihood of a loss 
with the same mean likelihood. The median premium values were ﬁ  ve 
times higher for the uncertain risk than for the well-  speciﬁ  ed probability 
when the losses from each insurance policy were independent. This ratio 
increased to ten times when the losses were perfectly correlated (Hogarth and 
Kunreuther 1989).
In another study, a questionnaire was mailed to 190 randomly chosen 
insurance companies of diﬀerent sizes asking underwriters to specify the 
prices that they would like to charge to insure a factory against property 
damage from a severe earthquake, to insure an underground storage tank, 
and to provide coverage for a neutral situation (i.e., a risk without any con-
text). Probabilities and losses were varied. The probability of loss and the 
size of the claim were either well- speciﬁ  ed or there was ambiguity regarding 
the likelihood of the loss and/  or the claim size. The underwriters wanted to 
charge considerably more for the same amount of coverage when either the 
probability was ambiguous and/ or the claim size was uncertain (Kunreuther 
et al. 1995).
Adverse Selection If the insurer sets a premium based on the average prob-
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with the highest risk will be the most likely to purchase coverage for that 
hazard. In an extreme case, the poor risks will be the only purchasers of 
coverage, and the insurer will lose money on each policy sold. This situation, 
referred to as adverse selection, occurs when the insurer cannot distinguish 
between the probabilities of a loss for good-   and poor-  risk categories, but 
the insured can.
Moral Hazard Moral hazard refers to an increase in the probability of loss 
caused by the behavior of the policyholder. For example, providing insurance 
protection to a nuclear power plant may lead the utility to behave more care-
lessly than if it did not have coverage. One way to avoid the problem of moral 
hazard is to introduce deductibles and coinsurance as part of the insur-
ance contract. A suﬃciently large deductible can act as an incentive for the 
insureds to continue to behave carefully after purchasing coverage because 
they will be forced to cover a signiﬁ  cant portion of their loss themselves. With 
coinsurance, the insurer and the insured share the loss together. As with a 
deductible, this type of risk- sharing arrangement encourages safer behavior 
because those insured want to avoid having to pay for some of the losses.
Catastrophic Losses A nuclear power plant accident can produce cata-
strophic losses. Insurers who cover the risks from such disasters may have 
to pay potentially large claims to policyholders before they are able to collect 
suﬃcient premiums to cover their costs. This timing risk is an important 
element associated with catastrophic losses (Litan 2006). Rating agencies 
may also play a role in inﬂ  uencing how many policies an insurer will want 
to write on risks with respect to catastrophic losses. A recent report by the 
AM Best Company focuses on the importance of the ratio of annual insured 
catastrophic losses as percentage of policyholder surplus (PHS). In general, 
the report notes that the higher the level of loss relative to surplus, the greater 
has been the ﬁ  nancial damage to the insurance industry (Williams and 
King 2006).
Condition 3: Earning a Positive Expected Proﬁ  t by Marketing Coverage
In theory, insurers can oﬀer protection against any risk that they can 
identify and for which they can obtain information to estimate the frequency 
and magnitude of potential losses as long as they have the freedom to set 
premiums at any level. However, due to problems of ambiguity, adverse 
selection, moral hazard, and highly correlated losses, they may want to 
charge premiums that considerably exceed the expected loss. For some 
risks the desired premium may be so high that there would be very little 
demand for coverage at that rate. In such cases, even though an insurer 
determines that a particular risk meets the two insurability conditions 
discussed previously, it will not invest the time and money to develop the 
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More speciﬁ  cally, the insurer must be convinced that there is suﬃcient 
demand to cover the development and marketing costs of the coverage 
through future premiums received. If there are regulatory restrictions that 
limit the price insurers can charge for certain types of coverage, then compa-
nies will not want to provide protection against these risks. In addition, if an 
insurer’s portfolio leaves them vulnerable to the possibility of extremely large 
losses from a given disaster due to adverse selection, moral hazard, and/  or 
high correlation of risks, then the insurer will want to reduce the number of 
policies in force for these hazards.
9.6.3      Conclusions on Insurability of Nuclear Reactors
The catastrophic risks associated with a meltdown of a reactor in a popu-
lated area, together with the release of radioactivity, are unlikely to be read-
ily insurable. The risks are unique and massive, and not well understood. 
Problems of moral hazard and adverse selection may also be serious. If 
private insurers were to charge a premium that reﬂ  ected their risk given the 
aforementioned features, it is likely to be considerably higher than if there 
was some public sector involvement. The Price-  Anderson Act was passed 
in this spirit but has not been evaluated with respect to how well it meets 
society’s needs. We now address this question.
9.7      Evaluating the Price-  Anderson Act as an Insurance Program
Price-  Anderson can provide as much as $10 billion of insurance to cover 
catastrophic losses. This is perhaps 10 percent of the likely cost of a melt-
down associated with the release of radioactivity. The Act cannot pro-
vide adequate coverage should there be a severe nuclear accident. The gap 
between what is available under the Act and what would be needed would 
almost certainly be ﬁ  lled by the Federal Government. In other words, there 
is a potential liability by the public sector of $100 billion (or possibly much 
more) under the Price-  Anderson Act. The probability that this liability will 
be incurred is small, so the expected value of the liability is perhaps in the 
range of billions rather than tens of billions.
9.7.1    Regulatory  Capture
The risk that the government faces with respect to nuclear accidents is not 
entirely outside of its control. The government has to license nuclear power 
stations, and the NRC sets safety standards that if well enforced could cut 
the government’s risk signiﬁ  cantly. There is a lot of evidence that the NRC 
suﬀers from regulatory capture and has performed poorly in its role of safety 
overseer (Lochbaum 2006). The Federal Government can also reduce the 
risks associated with nuclear power by inﬂ  uencing the location of nuclear 
power points to more remote locations rather than major population cen-
ters, so as to reduce potential liabilities.Environment and Energy: Catastrophic Liabilities    2 4 7
9.7.2      Subsidies Associated with Price-  Anderson
Utilities are subsidized under the P-  A Act because they are only respon-
sible for damage up to about $10 billion. Canada has a similar cap on dam-
ages speciﬁ  ed in the 1970 Nuclear Liability Act. The Canadian courts were 
forced to address the decreased incentive that this limited liability provides 
for investing in safety measures. In fact, the economist Ralph Winter, in a 
commentary on Ontario Hydro’s behavior, pointed out that the utility is 
looking for alternatives to investing in safety measures because of the high 
costs associated with them (Heyes 2002–2003).
Another disincentive for utilities to invest in safety measures stems from 
the fact that insurance premiums do not reﬂ  ect the performance and related 
risk associated with a nuclear power plant. Should there be an outage by a 
plant, the premiums are not adjusted upward to reﬂ  ect the higher risk. By 
not having experience-  rated premiums there is a type of interdependence 
that can be deleterious to all utilities in the industry. The ﬁ  nancial vulner-
ability of one nuclear power plant depends not only on its own choice of 
security investments, but also on the actions of other agents. Inadequate 
investment elsewhere can raise a plant’s premiums. This concept of interde-
pendent security implies that outage in one plant could have ﬁ  nancial impacts 
on all the other utilities operating nuclear power plants. As a result there may 
be suboptimal investment in the individual components (Kunreuther and 
Heal 2003; Heal and Kunreuther 2005). The existence of such interdepen-
dencies provides another challenge in determining the design of a nuclear 
power plant insurance program.
9.8    Modifying  Price-  Anderson
9.8.1      Learning from Other Federal and State Catastrophe Programs12
We now review the roles that the federal and state governments in the 
United States play in supplementing or replacing private insurance with 
respect to natural disasters and other catastrophic losses. In many respects, 
the problems faced in these areas are similar to those associated with nuclear 
accidents: they involve low-  probability, high-  cost risks for which the likeli-
hoods of an accident are uncertain. Hence, there are lessons to be learned 
from these other areas. We shall discuss insurance against ﬂ  oods, hurricanes, 
and earthquakes as well as terrorism insurance.
Flood Insurance
Insurers have experimented over the years with providing protection 
against water damage from ﬂ  oods, hurricanes, and other storms. After the 
12. The material in this subsection appears in Wharton Risk Center (2005).248        Geoffrey Heal and Howard Kunreuther
severe Mississippi Floods of 1927, they concluded that the risk was too great 
for them to insure and refused to continue doing so. As a result, Congress 
created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in 1968, whereby 
homeowners and businesses could purchase coverage for water damage. 
Private insurers market the ﬂ  ood policies, and the premiums are deposited 
in a federally operated Flood Insurance Fund, which is then responsible 
for paying claims. The stipulation for this ﬁ  nancial protection is that the 
local community makes a commitment to regulate the location and design 
of future ﬂ  oodplain construction to increase safety from ﬂ  ood hazards. 
The Federal Government established a series of building and development 
standards for ﬂ  oodplain construction to serve as minimum requirements 
for participation in the program. The creation of the Community Rating 
System in 1990 has linked mitigation measures with the price of insurance 
in a systematic way (Pasterick 1998).
Hurricane Insurance
The need for hurricane insurance is most pronounced in the state of 
Florida. Following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, nine property-  casualty 
insurance companies became insolvent, forcing other insurers to cover these 
losses under Florida’s State Guaranty Fund. Property insurance became 
more diﬃcult to obtain as many insurers reduced their concentrations of 
insured property in coastal areas. During a special session of the Florida 
State Legislature in 1993, the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (FHCF) 
was created to relieve pressure on insurers to reduce their exposures to hurri-
cane losses. The FHCF, a tax- exempt trust fund administered by the state of 
Florida, is ﬁ  nanced by premiums paid by insurers that write policies on per-
sonal and commercial residential properties. The fund reimburses a portion 
of insurers’ losses following major hurricanes (above the insurer’s retention 
level) and enables insurers to remain solvent (Lecomte and Gahagan 1998). 
The four hurricanes that hit Florida in the fall of 2004 (Charley, Frances, 
Ivan, and Jeanne) caused an estimated $23 billion in insured losses, with 
only about $2.6 billion paid out by the Fund. Each hurricane was considered 
a distinct event, so that retention levels were applied to each storm before 
insurers could turn to the FHCF.
During a special session of the Florida State Legislature in January 2007, 
the capacity of the FHCF was expanded to $27.75 billion in insurance. 
However, there would have to be no damaging hurricanes until the year 
2024 for the FHCF to pay all its claims from a hurricane with a 500-  year 
return period. If such a disaster occurred before that date, the additional 
capacity to meet all the FHCF claims would have to come from assessing all 
property and casualty lines of business, excluding workers’ compensation, 
accident and health, medical malpractice, and ﬂ  ood insurance (Kunreuther 
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Earthquake Insurance
The history of earthquake activity in California convinced legislators that 
this risk was too great to be left in the hands of private insurers alone. In 
1985, a California law required insurers writing homeowners’ coverage on 
one-   to four-  unit residential buildings to also oﬀer earthquake coverage. 
Because rates were regulated by the state, insurers felt they were forced to 
oﬀer coverage against older structures in poor condition, with rates not 
necessarily reﬂ  ecting the risk. Following the 1994 Northridge earthquake, 
huge insured property losses created a surge in demand for coverage. Insur-
ers were concerned that if they satisﬁ  ed the entire demand, as they were 
required to do by the 1985 law, they would face an unacceptable level of risk 
and become insolvent following the next major earthquake. Hence, many 
ﬁ  rms decided to stop oﬀering coverage or restricted the sale of homeowners’ 
policies in California.
In order to keep earthquake insurance available in California, in 1996 the 
State legislature authorized the formation of the California Earthquake 
Authority (CEA), a state-  run insurance company that provides earthquake 
coverage to homeowners. The innovative feature of this ﬁ  nancing plan is 
the ability to pay for a large earthquake while committing relatively few 
dollars up front. There was an initial assessment of insurers of $1 bil-
lion to start the program and then contingent assessments to the insur-
ance industry and reinsurers following a severe earthquake. Policyholders 
absorb the ﬁ  rst portion of an earthquake through a 15 percent deduct-
ible on their policies (Roth 1998). However, twelve years after the crea-
tion of the CEA, the take-  up rate for homeowners was about 15 percent, 
down from 30 percent when the California State Legislature created the 
CEA (Risk Management Solutions 2004). It is questionable how eﬀective 
this program will be in covering losses should a major earthquake occur 
in California.
Federal Aviation Administration Third-  Party Liability Insurance Program
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US commercial 
aviation industry can purchase insurance for third- party liability arising out 
of aviation terrorism. The current mechanism operates as a pure govern-
ment program, with premiums paid by airlines into the Aviation Insurance 
Revolving Fund managed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
As the program carries a liability limit of only $100 million, losses paid 
by government sources in the event of an attack will almost surely exceed 
those available through the current insurance regime. In that case, either the 
government would need to appropriate additional disaster assistance funds 
as it did in the aftermath of September 11, or victims would be forced to rely 
on traditional sources of assistance (Strauss 2005).250        Geoffrey Heal and Howard Kunreuther
Terrorism Insurance
Insuring the risks from terrorist attacks has some similarity to insuring 
nuclear accidents—indeed, one worst-  case terrorist scenario involves ter-
rorists causing a nuclear accident. In both cases the probability distribu-
tion over possible losses is largely a matter of guesswork, with no historical 
record to provide a benchmark. And in both cases, government policies can 
inﬂ  uence the risks. So it is worth spending some time reviewing the extensive 
recent discussion of how to manage terrorist risks.
Prior to September 11, terrorism exclusions in commercial property and 
casualty policies in the US insurance market were extremely rare (outside of 
ocean marine) because losses from terrorism had historically been small and, 
to a large degree, uncorrelated. Attacks of a domestic origin were isolated, 
carried out by groups or individuals with disparate agendas. Thus the United 
States did not face a concerted domestic terrorism threat, as did countries 
such as France, Israel, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
In fact, insurance losses from terrorism were viewed as so improbable 
that the risk was not explicitly mentioned nor priced in any standard pol-
icy and it was never excluded from so-  called “all-  risk” policies with the 
exception of some marine cargo, aviation, and political risk policies. Even 
the ﬁ  rst attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) in 199313 and the Okla-
homa City bombing of 199514 were not seen as being threatening enough 
for insurers to consider revising their view of terrorism as a peril worth 
considering when pricing a commercial insurance policy. Since insurers 
and reinsurers felt that the likelihood of a major terrorist loss was below 
their threshold level of concern, they did not pay close attention to their 
potential losses from terrorism in the United States (Kunreuther and 
Pauly 2005).
Terrorism presents a set of very speciﬁ  c problems regarding its insurabil-
ity by the private market alone that have similar features to nuclear power. 
These include the potential for catastrophic losses, the existence of inter-
dependencies, and the dynamic uncertainty associated with the risk. All 
of these factors increase the amount of capital that insurers must hold to 
provide terrorism risk insurance coverage. The associated costs of holding 
that capital increases the premiums they would need to charge. The fact 
that government actions are likely to inﬂ  uence both the will and capacity 
of terrorist groups to attack (foreign policy, counterterrorism) and the level 
of potential losses poses additional challenges. These challenges are closely 
related to the fact that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission inﬂ  uences the 
13. The 1993 bombing of the WTC killed six people and caused $725 million in insured 
damages. See Swiss Re (2002).
14. Prior to September 11, the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, which killed 168 people, 
had been the most damaging terrorist attack on domestic soil, but the largest losses were to 
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degree of acceptability of the risks facing nuclear power plants. The conclu-
sion that emerges from experience with terrorist coverage since September 
11 suggests that this risk is not well handled by the insurance market. This 
was recognized by the passage of TRIA, the Terrorist Risk Insurance Act, 
which established a role for the Federal Government similar to that assigned 
to it in the P-  A Act.
To more fully understand the losses from September 11 from an insur-
ability perspective, one can compare this event with other types of extreme 
events that have aﬀected the (re)insurance industry. Table 9.1 presents the 
twenty largest worldwide insurance losses due to natural catastrophes and 
man-  made disasters from 1970 to 2008. Prior to September 11 losses, the 
largest loss experienced by the insurance industry was Hurricane Andrew, 
which devastated the coasts of Florida in August 1992 and inﬂ  icted $24.6 
billion in claims payments (indexed to 2008) (Swiss Re 2009). When one adds 
the 6 to 7 billion dollars in payments by the US Federal Victim Compensa-
tion Fund to victims of September 11 and their families, the claims from the 
terrorist attacks are almost twice those from Hurricane Andrew (Congres-
sional Budget Oﬃce 2005). Claims from a major nuclear accident could be 
very much larger even than those associated with September 11.
Table 9.1  The twenty most costly insured catastrophes in the world, 1970-  2008 
US $ billion  Event   
Victims 
(dead or missing)    Year    Area of primary damage 
48.1 Hurricane Katrina  1,836 2005 US, Gulf of Mexico 
36.8 9/11 attacks  3,025 2001 US 
24.6 Hurricane Andrew  43 1992 US, Bahamas 
20.3 Northridge earthquake 61 1994 US 
16.0 Hurricane Ike  348 2008 US, Caribbean 
14.6 Hurricane Ivan  124 2004 US, Caribbean 
13.8 Hurricane Wilma  35 2005 US, Gulf of Mexico 
11.1 Hurricane Rita  34 2005 US, Gulf of Mexico 
9.1 Hurricane Charley  24 2004 US, Caribbean 
8.9 Typhoon Mireille  51 1991 Japan 
7.9 Hurricane Hugo  71 1989 Puerto Rico, US 
7.7 Winterstorm Daria  95 1990 France, UK 
7.5 Winterstorm Lothar  110 1999 France, Switzerland 
6.3 Winterstorm Kyrill  54 2007 Germany, UK, NL, France 
5.9 Storms and ﬂ  oods  22 1987 France, UK 
5.8 Hurricane Frances  38 2004 US, Bahamas 
5.2 Winterstorm Vivian  64 1990 Western/Central Europe 
5.2 Typhoon Bart  26 1999 Japan 
5.0 Hurricane Gustav  153 2008 US, Caribbean 
4.7   Hurricane Georges    600   1998  US, Caribbean 
Sources: Wharton Risk Center with data from Swiss Re and Insurance Information Institute.
Note: This table excludes payments for ﬂ  ood by the National Flood Insurance Program in the United 
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9.8.2      Linking Insurance with Third-  Party Inspections 
Via Public-  Private Partnerships15
The Price-  Anderson Act needs to be modiﬁ  ed to provide a more eﬀective 
way of monitoring utilities and rewarding those that have undertaken risk-
  reducing measures. Today there is inadequate inspection of nuclear plants 
due to limited personnel at the NRC and the lack of incentives by utilities to 
undertake these measures on their own. Low inspection levels (and low usage 
of other eﬀective methods for compliance evaluation) may lead to low com-
pliance rates and reduce opportunities for government to ﬁ  nd and require 
ﬁ  rms to correct the sorts of risky practices regulations seek to reduce.
Role of Third-  Party Inspections
One way to change the situation is to provide economic incentives to utili-
ties to have their plants inspected. After demonstrating that they are oper-
ating safely, they could be rewarded with a lower insurance premium. The 
combination of private inspection and insurance is a potentially powerful 
one for meeting and often exceeding environmental and safety regulations. 
If an inspection reveals ways that a company can reduce its safety and envi-
ronmental risks, and the costs of undertaking this activity can be recouped 
in the form of lower insurance premiums that justify the expenditure, then 
ﬁ  rms will want to adopt these measures.
Insurers have an economic incentive to conduct inspections that focus on 
risk reduction because they want to reduce the likelihood of paying a claim 
and the size of their payments. The insurer’s economic survival depends on 
estimating the risk of future losses accurately, not on assuring compliance 
with government laws. To the extent that regulations are well-  aligned with 
risk- reducing behaviors, insurers are likely to uncover noncompliance prob-
lems and encourage their correction.
How Inspections Aid Insurers. Insurance is likely to have greater risk-
  reducing potential if insurers include inspections, along with other forms 
of risk assessment, as part of the insurance-  rating package. Private insur-
ance inspections can play an important role for several reasons. At the most 
basic level, insured ﬁ  rms will be more aware of environmental and safety 
risks as well as regulatory obligations. This promises to be especially valu-
able in areas of health, safety, and the environment that are plagued by low 
inspection levels.
Gathering Risk Information. Inspections also enable the insurer to deter-
mine how ﬁ  rms investing in risk- reducing measures are likely to reduce their 
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losses. Insurers can also provide guidance to the ﬁ  rm as to what types of 
actions would be most proﬁ  table for them to undertake to meet or exceed 
compliance with regulations. If insurers increase their inspections of a ﬁ  rm’s 
safety practices prior to policy renewals, ﬁ  rms will have incentives to comply 
with the regulations.
Use of Claims Data to Modify Existing Standards. Studying information 
about claims, incidents, and noncompliance may identify recurring events 
and high-  cost problems calling for new laws or standards. If an insurer has 
a large enough set of clients and can pool information so as not to reveal 
identities of ﬁ  rms, then it can provide valuable information to the public 
sector on the types of claims that have been made. This will enable the public 
sector agency to modify codes and standards in an appropriate fashion.
Rewarding Firms for Reducing Risks. Insurers providing coverage to com-
mercial enterprises always have the option of raising rates to reﬂ  ect addi-
tional risks that they uncover. Insurers can also bestow rewards on ﬁ  rms that 
operate at the highest level of compliance and take risk-  reducing actions 
beyond their formal obligations. Seals of approval are valuable to the ﬁ  rm 
to the extent that customers, employees, and investors make decisions on the 
basis of safety and environmental records of diﬀerent organizations. Some 
commercial partners will see the seal of approval as the designation of a 
quality operation and favor doing business with these ﬁ  rms.
The ﬁ  rm that earns the seal will have an incentive to reveal its third-  party 
commendation to the public as well as to the government. Regulatory agen-
cies can utilize this information to target inspections to ﬁ  rms that have not 
had this oﬃcial recognition; thus, there is a greater chance that those who 
have not complied with the regulation will be audited by a governmental 
agency. By raising the probability of a public inspection, more and more 
ﬁ  rms should adhere to regulations over time.
An insurance commendation is likely to have greater veracity than other 
sorts of third-  party certiﬁ  cations because most third-  party inspectors are 
paid a fee for their services by the inspected ﬁ  rm, and therefore feel a con-
stant tug to keep their customer happy without a strong counterbalancing 
ﬁ  nancial tug to identify risks that may require costly corrections. Insurers, 
in contrast, have a direct ﬁ  nancial interest in reducing risk through their 
inspections.
9.9    Summary  and  Conclusions
On the general issue of environmental liabilities, it seems clear that the 
degradation of natural capital in systems as diverse as the climate sys-
tem or the coastal barrier island systems can lead to signiﬁ  cant social 254        Geoffrey Heal and Howard Kunreuther
costs that are generally not well-  covered by current insurance prod-
ucts. These end up as liabilities of the Federal Government by default, 
often as a part of the portfolio of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency.
In the ﬁ  eld of nuclear risks, the Price-  Anderson Act transfers signiﬁ  cant 
liabilities to the Federal Government. If there is an expansion of the use 
of nuclear power in the next decade, as appears to be the case, then these 
liabilities could increase further. Although it is clear that the contingent 
federal liabilities associated with P- A are large, it is hard to be precise about 
them. The probability of a major accident at a nuclear reactor (e.g., a core 
meltdown) and its costs are ambiguous.
There are, however, certain things that are clear. One is that the risk is to 
some degree under the control of the Federal Government, via the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, if it enforces safety standards and inﬂ  uences the 
siting of nuclear reactors in remote areas. There is empirical evidence that 
the NRC does not aggressively pursue and penalize mismanagement of 
nuclear power stations, and that the Federal authorities are not sensitive to 
the increase in potential costs associated with siting near densely populated 
areas. There is scope for better management of this aspect of Federal ﬁ  nan-
cial risks, possibly by the use of third-  party safety auditors to supplement 
the NRC. In addition, the premiums charged to utilities under the P-  A Act 
do not reﬂ  ect their stations’ safety risks: this would be another way of reduc-
ing the risk of a disaster. Currently there are few incentives for a utility to 
improve its safety record.
There do seem to be compelling reasons for thinking that Federal inter-
vention is necessary if the risk of nuclear disaster is to be adequately insured. 
There are many characteristics of this risk that probably make it uninsur-
able. But that does not mean that the P-  A Act is the best solution. We have 
reviewed the ways in which catastrophic risks are managed in other areas, 
such as ﬂ  ood, hurricane, earthquake, and terrorist risks. There has been 
considerably more constructive public debate about these risks than about 
nuclear risks. Typical of most of these areas is a ﬁ  rst insurance layer cov-
ered by private insurance markets, with government coverage of losses in 
excess of the private risk cap. In the case of the P-  A Act, the private cover-
age is just $300 million per incident, with a pool insurance vehicle cover-
ing the next $10 billion. There is no explicit statement of the government’s 
role and liabilities. The ﬁ  gure of $300 million surely does not exhaust the 
private sector’s available capital for covering losses from a nuclear power 
plant accident. For other areas the private sector provides coverage as high 
as $10 billion or more. More of the nuclear risk could surely be met through 
the private sector. This would not only reduce the Federal liability but also 
provide increased incentives for risk management, sadly lacking under the 
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On a more general note, the increased concern with the impacts of climate 
change on the environment suggests that one rethink the role that FEMA 
and other public sector agencies at the local, state, and federal levels can 
play in reducing losses from future disasters. There is a need for innovative 
private-  public sector initiatives to avoid the problems inherent in myopic 
thinking. For example, in order to encourage residents and businesses to 
adopt risk-  reducing measures with respect to natural and man-  made haz-
ards, multiyear contracts such as ﬁ  ve-to-ten-year insurance policies and 
long-  term loans should be considered (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 
2010). The need for such long- term thinking appears more important today 
than it did a few years ago, with respect to reducing the catastrophic losses 
from environmental risks and encouraging a rethinking of the sources of 
energy that addresses the problems of climate change.
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Comment  William Pizer
Key decisions in public policy often come down to eﬀorts to weigh the costs 
and beneﬁ  ts of various alternatives. In order for such eﬀorts to be mean-
ingful, it is important to include all major sources of costs and beneﬁ  ts—
otherwise, what may appear to be a reasonable choice can turn out to be 
quite the opposite when a full accounting occurs. The question would then 
seem to be, what are the key categories of costs and beneﬁ  ts?
This could be the primary focus of Heal and Kunreuther, who turn their 
attention to a broad category of such costs and beneﬁ  ts—environmental 
assets and liabilities—in order to see if there are any lessons for current 
policymakers. Their chapter breaks down into two parts: ﬁ  rst, a review of 
environmental assets and accounting; and second, a review of environmen-
tal liabilities and insurance, with a particular emphasis on nuclear power. 
Each part oﬀers lessons for improving public policy decisions.
The ﬁ  rst section reviews a number of examples where environmental 
assets have or have not been valued. The Catskills provide signiﬁ  cant value 
to New York City in terms of their ability to cleanse and stabilize the ﬂ  ow 
of water to New York. Forests oﬀer value in terms of sequestered carbon 
dioxide that otherwise contributes to global climate change. Oil, gas, coal, 
and other mineral deposits have very clear market value. Soil provides agri-
cultural productivity. And the climate system, to date, has provided relatively 
stable climate and weather patterns that have allowed regions to develop and 
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